Arabic: https://kedencentre.org/2025/08/11/foreign-presence-sudan/

Introduction

The Sudanese capital, Khartoum, and a number of other cities have witnessed, during May, June, and July 2025, an escalating security and media campaign targeting foreign presence, especially Ethiopian nationals and citizens of South Sudan. This campaign comes amidst an atmosphere charged with armed conflict between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces, amid mutual accusations of involving foreigners in the fighting, and under the cover of reorganizing the foreign presence, according to what official authorities have announced. However, the contexts point to more complex dimensions blending the political, security-related, and racist.

According to data from the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Sudan hosted, before the outbreak of war in April 2023, about 1.3 million refugees and asylum seekers, including at least 900,000 from neighboring countries like South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Chad. With the outbreak of war and the exacerbation of internal displacement, the issue of the “foreign presence” has been exploited as a rhetorical tool in the context of the war, particularly by media institutions and parties associated with the former regime (National Congress), which has increased the mobilizing and selective nature of dealing with the issue.

In May 2025, the Sudanese Ministry of Interior announced the start of an official campaign to deport “violating” foreigners, confirming via an official statement that “the General Administration of Passports and Immigration has begun, in coordination with relevant authorities, implementing the national campaign for the deportation of violating foreigners, within the framework of the plan to organize and control the movement of foreigners in the country.” The Governor of Khartoum, Ahmed Osman, also stated that “the plan will include all foreigners without exception,” a statement that appears neutral on the surface but actually intersects with media campaigns and political discourses that systematically target specific nationalities.

These measures were linked to a mobilizing discourse associating the presence of foreigners with espionage or fighting alongside the Rapid Support Forces, without providing sufficient legal evidence. Collective accusations were circulated via media outlets loyal to the army and voices from the former regime, speaking of alleged “sabotage and intelligence roles.” In a controversial statement, Nidal Osman, Media and Public Relations Advisor to the leader of the Tamboro forces (allied with the army), said that “the battle of dignity will be the beginning of the end for the foreign presence in Sudan,” affirming that the “authentic Sudanese people” have returned to unite behind their army in facing what she described as “the rebellion.”

It is worth noting that the Sudanese police, even before the outbreak of war, carried out periodic inspection campaigns that targeted even regular migrants and some refugees, and these campaigns often led to arbitrary arrests and exorbitant fines, within a system known as “Public Order Courts,” which were heavily criticized by human rights organizations for their lack of procedural justice and their use as a tool for discrimination and extortion.

However, the current escalation goes beyond direct legal or security considerations; it reflects a broader ideological-security trend seeking to redefine national identity on exclusionary foundations, excluding foreigners and vulnerable groups from the public sphere, and re-establishing the old supremacist state project. This trend evokes the legacy of the former regime, which has always linked concepts of security with ethnic and religious belonging, and grants the military institution a popular cover to reproduce its symbolic authority. It is also used by some actors within the army as a tool to enhance its legitimacy against the Rapid Support Forces, by portraying it as the guardian of national sovereignty and the representative of the “authentic Sudanese” facing the “foreign danger,” reflecting a deeper attempt to restore hegemony over the state and society at a moment of comprehensive collapse of political and legal references.

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Report Objectives

This report focuses on the phenomenon of forced deportation and expulsion of foreign refugees and migrants from Sudan, especially since the outbreak of war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces on April 15, 2023. It aims to document and analyze the policies and practices followed by the Sudanese authorities towards foreigners, and the resulting serious breaches of the principle of non-refoulement, and violations of Sudan’s obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

The report seeks to achieve the following objectives:

• Document cases of forced deportation and associated violations, including mass arrests, arbitrary detention, and ill-treatment during deportation.

• Analyze the national legal and regulatory frameworks related to residence, immigration, and asylum, and the extent of their compliance with international standards, particularly the principle of non-refoulement.

• Monitor shifts in the official and media discourse that accompanied the expulsion campaigns, and how it was employed to turn public opinion and justify violations.

• Highlight aspects of discrimination and collective violations that affected specific categories of refugees and migrants, such as Ethiopians and citizens of South Sudan.

• Alert the international community and UN organizations to the escalation of violations, and call for urgent interventions to protect affected groups and prevent further forced expulsion.

• Present actionable recommendations for the Sudanese authorities, and for international and regional organizations, to stop forced deportation and ensure respect for the fundamental rights of foreigners.

• Support evidence-based legal and rights advocacy efforts, and build a solid foundation for future accountability for these violations.

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Documentation and Analysis Methodology

This report relied on a multi-source methodology, combining field research and rights-based analysis, and included the following:

• Direct testimonies and qualitative interviews with affected refugees and migrants, conducted through field intermediaries or via telephone during the period from May to July 2025.

• Review of official documents issued by the Sudanese authorities regarding immigration, residence, and forced expulsion policies, along with relevant legal files.

• Content analysis from open sources, including credible media coverage and verified testimonies published on social media.

All data was analyzed from a legal and human rights perspective, with strict adherence to standards of integrity and ethical documentation, and ensuring full confidentiality of the identities of witnesses and sources to protect them from any potential harm.

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Temporal and Geographical Scope

This report covers the period extending from April 15, 2023, the date of the outbreak of war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, until July 30, 2025, with a focus on decisions issued since March 2025 regarding foreigners. It also addresses the changing contexts in state policies towards foreigners before and after the current war.

In terms of geographical scope, the report focuses primarily on the capital Khartoum and Gezira State, where widespread violations against refugees and migrants have been recorded.

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Historical Background

Since Sudan’s independence in 1956, its geographical location and ethnic diversity have created an environment attractive to widespread regional movement, serving as a transit point and place of settlement for refugees from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and other countries, especially in the 1970s and 1980s due to armed conflicts and famines. Sudan hosted hundreds of thousands of refugees at the time, relying on the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 OAU Convention.

Despite this role, the state did not develop coherent asylum policies; instead, it witnessed periods of politicization and security exploitation of the refugee file, especially during periods of military rule and in the 1990s under the Bashir regime, when the file of foreigners became a tool for negotiation and political pressure. Security campaigns against some communities expanded, alongside legal discrimination and economic exploitation, and the deprivation of the majority from legal documents.

At the turn of the millennium, irregular migration via Sudan escalated, and it became a major corridor for migrants heading to Europe, which aroused European interest leading to security cooperation policies, especially after the “Khartoum Process” (2015). Despite the international support Sudan received to control migration, those policies effectively empowered security agencies and gave them tools to suppress foreigners instead of protecting them, amid increasing impunity.

In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war in April 2023, public discourse towards foreigners became more hostile, associating their presence with the economic crisis and security breakdown. Media and security campaigns began to emerge, promoting the linking of foreigners to crime or threats to sovereignty, creating fertile ground for the escalation of discrimination and institutional violence.

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Context – The April 15 War and Shifts in State Policies Towards Foreigners

The outbreak of war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces on April 15, 2023, led to a comprehensive collapse of state institutions, turning the country into an environment extremely dangerous for refugees, migrants, and foreigners in general. A severe deterioration was recorded in the judicial and administrative systems, opening the door to repressive practices and grave violations.

In the absence of judicial and institutional oversight, security and military entities, in addition to the Ministry of Interior, intensified campaigns of arrest, arbitrary detention, and forced deportation. Laws and courts that were abolished or suspended, such as the Public Order Courts, were reactivated to prosecute foreigners on charges of forgery or expired residence, amid the denial of basic legal guarantees.

Some foreigners were forcibly returned to Sudan after third countries refused to receive them, while cases of arbitrary handover of foreigners to their countries were recorded despite threats to their lives, in a clear violation of the principle of non-refoulement stipulated in international law. Notably, these practices were no longer confined to official state apparatuses but extended to de facto authorities, militias, and informal networks, increasing the severity of the situation.

These policies were reflected internally and externally; internally, foreigners became one of the most vulnerable groups, and externally, Sudanese in neighboring countries, especially South Sudan and Uganda, faced harassment and retaliatory treatment on the background of events in Sudan.

These transformations reflect not only a legal crisis but also a part of the reproduction of power and identities in post-war Sudan, where the constitutional framework is absent, the jurisdictions of security and military agencies overlap, and the files of foreigners are used as tools for social and political control.

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Legal Basis

Sudan’s dealings with foreigners, including refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers, are subject to a multi-level legal system comprising national law, international standards, and regional agreements. This system obligates the state to provide protection, ensure protection from refoulement, humane treatment, and due process, especially in the context of the ongoing armed conflict since April 2023.

National Law

• Constitutional Document (2019): Despite being suspended, it remains an important reference for rights; Articles 7 and 27 guarantee respect for human rights for all individuals, including foreigners.

• Asylum Regulation Law (1974): Grants the Refugee Commission powers to protect refugees and prohibits illegal expulsion.

• Passports and Immigration Law (1994): Regulates the residence of foreigners and the conditions for legal deportation, requiring procedures that consider the right to appeal.

• Criminal Procedure Law (1991): Regulates detention conditions and prohibits arbitrary arrest or torture.

• Criminal Law: Criminalizes degrading treatment and unlawful detention.

International Law

• Refugee Convention (1951) and Protocol (1967): Prohibit the expulsion or return of any person to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened (principle of non-refoulement).

• Convention against Torture (1984): Prohibits the extradition or return of any person to a country where they are likely to be subjected to torture. Sudan ratified it in 2021.

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966): Guarantees the right to life, freedom of movement, protection from arbitrary detention and fair trial, and its provisions apply to everyone, citizens and foreigners alike.

Regional Obligations

• Kampala Convention (2009): Although focused on internally displaced persons, it includes obligations to protect those affected by conflicts, including foreigners.

• African Union Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter): Affirms the protection of human dignity and prohibits the mass expulsion of foreigners, and guarantees freedom of movement and choice of residence.

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Official Policies and Practices Towards Foreigners

First: Before the Outbreak of War – A Fluctuating Approach between Absorption and Surveillance

Sudan’s policy towards foreigners, especially non-Sudanese refugees and migrants, witnessed repeated shifts before April 15, 2023, due to changing governments and state priorities. Historically, this policy was characterized by a mix of humanitarian commitment, engagement in international agreements, alongside the utilization of the foreign presence as a political and security tool.

During the transitional period (2019–2021), the civilian government announced its intention to reform the asylum law and regulate the status of refugees, especially from neighboring countries. However, practices on the ground continued to suffer from violations, most notably arbitrary arrests, inadequate detention conditions, and difficulties in registering refugees with the UNHCR and weak issuance of documents.

The Immigration Law and Public Order were also used to conduct swift trials, often without providing legal assistance, in a dual legal environment that did not effectively apply Sudan’s international obligations, leaving foreigners vulnerable to targeting and extortion.

Second: After the Outbreak of War – Militarization of Policy and Intensification of Targeting

With the outbreak of war in April 2023, the policy towards foreigners became more violent and volatile, especially in government-controlled areas. The presence of foreigners, particularly those with specific ethnic features or nationalities from neighboring countries, became associated with unproven security accusations.

• Administrative Decisions:
  In January 2024, the Ministry of Interior issued a decision requiring the updating of asylum cards for the continuation of residence, which exposed thousands to pursuit due to non-fulfillment of procedures.

• Arrest Campaigns:
  Raids and arbitrary arrests were carried out, including in markets and workplaces, accompanied by violations such as beatings, racial insults, and financial extortion. Many detainees were not allowed to communicate with lawyers or their families, and some were deported without clear legal procedures.

• Forced Expulsion:
  Deportation operations escalated, particularly to South Sudan, including sick individuals, women, and children, without giving them an opportunity to appeal or reapply for asylum.

• Trials:
  Prosecutions and courts such as the Airport Prosecution and former Public Order Courts were used to issue swift rulings, often without legal representation, in clear violation of justice standards.

• Role of Security Agencies:
  Cases of extortion at security checkpoints and restrictions on foreigners’ access to health and education services were observed, within a systematic behavior restricting their movement and isolating them socially.

• Official and Media Discourse:
  A mobilizing discourse was produced, linking foreigners to espionage and working for the Rapid Support Forces, fueled by media outlets loyal to the army and parties from the former regime. Descriptors such as “sleeper cells” and “mercenaries” were used, invoking narratives from previous conflicts to justify exclusion.

This orientation was evident in public statements by prominent military and media figures, most notably statements by Nidal Osman, an advisor to the leader of the Tamboro forces, who described the foreign presence as “pollution” and considered it a danger that must be eliminated. These statements, which combined explicit racism and incitement, were not met with official rejection, suggesting implicit complicity or full adoption of this discourse in some state institutions.

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Media Campaigns and Hate Speech

Parties within the state, particularly those associated with the army and the former regime, relied on escalating hate speech portraying foreigners as a security and existential danger. This was not confined to official media but extended to digital platforms and political statements. This discourse gradually turned into systematic practices: administrative restrictions, expulsion, and deprivation of services.

This pattern intersects with dangerous regional experiences, where hate speech is used to redefine national identity and portray the “other” as an internal enemy. The infiltration of this discourse into the consciousness of some societal segments, especially amidst living crises, threatens to create a fertile environment for collective violence and communal retaliation.

This incitement not only poses a danger to refugees but also undermines social peace in Sudan and places the state on a collision course with its international obligations, particularly the 1951 Refugee Convention. Therefore, the systematic documentation of these campaigns and the accountability of actors involved becomes an urgent priority, to ensure protection, combat hate speech, and push for media and legal alternatives that respect diversity and human dignity.

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Documented Violations

With the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, during the first half of 2025, security policies towards the foreign presence escalated, and the authorities of Khartoum State began implementing a forced deportation plan targeting hundreds of refugees and migrants, especially Ethiopian and South Sudanese nationals, under conditions lacking legal and humanitarian guarantees.

Beginning of Field Operations – March 2025

On March 10, 2025, the authorities of Khartoum State launched the first field deportation campaigns, beginning with transferring numbers of Ethiopians and their families from the neighborhoods of Al-Hilla Al-Jadida, Al-Goz, and Al-Daim to temporary camps in Gadaref State, eastern Sudan, in preparation for their subsequent return to the border area of Al-Qalabat with Ethiopia. The operation was supervised by the Refugee Commission and implemented via 10 designated buses, without prior warning or official notice to those concerned.

One of the deportees, an Ethiopian man in his thirties, said:

“We were sleeping when they banged on the door violently. They said we had only one minute to gather our belongings. We were not given a chance to explain anything or show any papers. It was chaos.”

Numerous testimonies indicate that dozens were forcibly transferred without checking their legal status, despite some of them possessing residence documents or refugee cards issued by the UNHCR.

Official Announcement – May 2025

On May 25, 2025, the Governor of Khartoum, Ahmed Osman Hamza, held an official meeting with the Committee for Controlling Foreign Presence, representatives of the Refugee Commission, the Alien Police, and the UNHCR. The meeting announced the start of implementing a plan to deport “violating” foreigners starting May 29.

This announcement came against the backdrop of unsubstantiated claims implicating “foreign mercenaries,” especially from Ethiopia and South Sudan, in fighting alongside the Rapid Support Forces during their control of parts of the capital. These claims led to an official and media discourse holding foreigners responsible for security issues and justifying deportation policies without distinction.

One of the Ethiopian women from the Al-Goz neighborhood said:

“They accused us of fighting with the Rapid Support Forces. We barely have food. My husband hasn’t left the house for a year because of the terror.”

The Second Phase – Implementation of Mass Deportation

On May 29, 2025, the second phase of the plan began, as the authorities of Khartoum State started implementing extensive census and gathering operations that included many neighborhoods in the city, concurrently with organizing deportation convoys to border states such as White Nile, Gadaref, and Kassala.

A witness who managed to escape from a gathering point in the Al-Daim neighborhood reported:

“They were calling out names from lists, and we don’t know where they got them from. Anyone who didn’t have an immediate paper was taken away immediately. But even those who had cards were not allowed to speak.”

It is mentioned that a large number of refugees were unable to renew their documents or obtain replacements due to the stoppage of state institutions, including the Passports Department, UNHCR offices, and the Refugee Commission, as a result of the war and destruction.

The Latest Campaign – July 2025

On July 29, 2025, a new deportation campaign launched from the East Al-Diyoum neighborhood was documented. Dozens of Ethiopians were taken to gathering centers and then transported out of the country without following any appeal procedures or verifying their status, and without notifying the UNHCR.

One of the women separated from their husbands during the campaign stated:

“They took my husband and my eldest son, and didn’t tell us where. We tried to reach the UNHCR but its offices are closed. There was no one to turn to.”

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Documentation of Cases

According to what was observed and documented in the field, the number of individuals subjected to forced deportation operations during the period from March to July 2025 was at least 502 people, all of Ethiopian nationality. The cases were distributed across several neighborhoods in the capital and included individuals holding legal documents, in addition to others who lost their papers due to war and displacement.

One of the deported young men, who was forcibly returned to Ethiopia, said:

“When we reached the border, they left us under the sun with soldiers we didn’t know. There was no Sudanese official with us. Just buses that dropped us off and left.”

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Recommendations

First: To the Sudanese Authorities

• Immediately stop all forced deportation operations and arbitrary detention based on identity or nationality.

• Review policies and procedures followed since the outbreak of war, and ensure their compliance with international human rights standards.

• Provide clear legal pathways to appeal deportation or detention decisions, and ensure individuals’ right to legal representation.

• Ensure access for foreigners, especially refugees and asylum seekers, to legal assistance and representatives of the UNHCR without restrictions.

Second: To International Organizations

• Strengthen mechanisms for public monitoring and documentation of violations of foreigners’ rights in Sudan, and submit periodic independent reports.

• Pressure the Sudanese authorities to adopt transparent accountability mechanisms and ensure accountability for entities involved in violations.

• Provide urgent legal and relief support to victims, especially the most vulnerable groups such as Eritreans and Ethiopians.

• Call on host countries of Sudanese refugees to avoid using the file of foreigners in Sudan as a tool for pressure or retaliation, refrain from “reciprocal treatment” policies, and provide humanitarian support without political conditions.

Third: To Local and International Civil Society

• Intensify field documentation and monitoring of violations of foreigners’ rights in Sudan.

• Engage effectively in rights-based and legal pressure efforts at the regional and international levels.

• Launch media campaigns highlighting the ongoing violations and calling for the opening of independent investigations and holding those responsible accountable before the law.