The First Shot Report

Executive Summary

This report, “The First Shot,” is issued by the Kaden Center for Justice and Human Rights as part of its “Fair Voice” project. It represents an analytical and documentary contribution to understanding the dimensions of hate speech rampant on Sudanese digital platforms, which has become one of the most dangerous symbolic tools fueling violence, legitimizing discrimination, and paving the way for grave human rights violations.

The report is based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of 337 publicly posted cases during June 2025 on three main platforms: X (Twitter), Facebook, and TikTok. Scientific analysis tools (SPSS and NVivo) were used to monitor and classify the discourse according to its three types: ethnic discourse, discourse based on political opinion, and dangerous discourse that includes direct incitement to violence, genocide, and collective threats.

The report concludes that the Sudanese digital space is witnessing high levels of incitement, dehumanization, accusations of treason, and denial of citizenship, and that these linguistic patterns are used to create an internal collective enemy and legitimize the practice of violence against them, whether materially or symbolically. The analysis also showed that some platforms like TikTok, despite having less published content, produce higher engagement, highlighting the role of short visual media in accelerating the spread of hate speech, especially among youth.

The report demonstrates how this discourse contributes to exacerbating violence by creating a perception that killing or exclusion is a legitimate solution, legitimizing discrimination by reviving ethnic and regional hierarchies that reproduce the concept of “full citizen” versus “outsider,” and justifying rights violations by linking the other to treason, impurity, or inferiority. The report also shows that hate speech produces a social and psychological environment that accepts and rewards violence, in the absence of legal or moral deterrents.

At the legal level, the report shows that this discourse represents a clear violation of several international conventions ratified by Sudan, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Racial Discrimination, the Rome Statute, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Furthermore, Sudanese criminal law does not contain sufficient or clear provisions to criminalize hate speech, leaving a dangerous legal vacuum exploited by political and military actors.

Based on the findings, the report presents a package of recommendations including:

  • The necessity of issuing national legislation explicitly criminalizing hate speech in accordance with international standards.
  • Activating the role of justice institutions and civil society in monitoring, accountability, and awareness.
  • Pressuring social media companies to enhance detection algorithms and effective response in the Sudanese context.
  • Expanding the mandate of international mechanisms, such as the Fact-Finding Mission and the International Criminal Court, to include hate speech as part of the structure of ongoing crimes and violations in Sudan.

In conclusion, the report emphasizes that confronting hate speech is not only a moral responsibility but also a legal, security, and societal priority, and that addressing it represents the cornerstone of any genuine path toward just and sustainable peace in Sudan.

Introduction

In light of the bloody conflict ravaging Sudan since April 2023, and the widespread destruction it has left in the social fabric, the disintegration of state institutions, and an unprecedented escalation in violence and violations, it has become necessary to shed light on the invisible dimensions of the conflict, foremost among them hate speech that is spreading at an accelerating pace in the digital space, playing a central role in fueling violence, feeding division, and justifying crimes.

Based on its mission to promote justice and accountability, the Kaden Center for Justice and Human Rights has prepared this report “The First Shot” within the framework of the “Fair Voice” program, which seeks to document, analyze, and combat hate speech in the Sudanese context, and produce in-depth rights-based knowledge that contributes to supporting justice efforts, reforming public discourse, and strengthening protection mechanisms. The “First Shot” report is the first in a series of periodic and non-periodic reports and studies that the Center will issue within the program’s projects, which will cover multiple issues related to hate speech.

This report focuses on “hate speech on Sudanese digital platforms during the conflict,” as a growing phenomenon in which language is used as a weapon for incitement, dehumanization, and legitimizing violations. The report presents qualitative and quantitative analysis of 337 publicly posted cases on X (formerly Twitter), Facebook, and TikTok platforms during June 2025, using scientific tools (NVivo, SPSS).

The cases were classified according to three main categories: ethnic discourse, discourse based on political opinion, and dangerous discourse that includes incitement to killing, genocide, and collective threats. The report also highlights the entities producing this discourse, the media used, the targeted groups, with an analysis of the resulting social and legal impact, linking it to the relevant national and international legal system.

The Kaden Center hopes through this work to contribute to opening a broad discussion about the relationship between discourse and violence, enhancing societal and institutional awareness of the dangers of normalizing hatred, and helping to build a legal and societal framework that contains incitement discourse, provides protection for victims, and paves the way for serious accountability and comprehensive justice.

This report is not only an attempt to document hate speech but a call to read it as a bridge between language and violence, between word and bullet, between complicity and silence. Unless this discourse is confronted as a systematic crime, the path to justice and peace will remain fraught with symbolic massacres before they become material.

General Context

The “First Shot” report comes in an extremely complex context experienced by the Republic of Sudan, where the country has witnessed since mid-April 2023 one of the most violent wars in its modern history, between the Sudanese Armed Forces led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). These confrontations erupted as a result of escalating tensions between the two military forces after the failure of the transitional settlement path and the stumbling of the proposed settlement to unify the armies as stipulated in the Framework Agreement signed in December 2022.

The conflict quickly expanded to include most areas of the capital Khartoum and the states of Darfur and Kordofan, taking on a dual character combining regular warfare and civil conflict driven by ethnic, political, and regional divisions. As a result, the country slipped into a state of institutional collapse, insecurity, service disruption, and large-scale internal and external displacement, with the number of internally displaced exceeding 7 million people, according to United Nations reports as of mid-2025.

In this troubled climate, social media platforms have transformed into parallel battlefields reflecting the state of acute polarization while simultaneously feeding it. Digital spaces have become charged arenas of hate speech, where tools of language, religion, ethnicity, and history are used to justify violence, incite it, or demonize political and ethnic opponents. Systematic campaigns have emerged seeking to symbolically eliminate the other, dehumanize them, or exclude them from the national conception, in the absence of deterrent legal controls and weak mechanisms for monitoring digital content.

Alongside the military division, the conflict has taken on a sharp ethnic dimension in the Darfur region, where massacres and collective cleansing operations have occurred in which the Rapid Support Forces and allied militias have been accused, especially against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups, amid international silence and UN inability to intervene effectively. In contrast, central and northern areas have witnessed an escalation in discourse hostile to “the margin,” and the duality of “River sons” versus “Western sons” has been entrenched, reflecting the fragility of national identity and the depth of historical wounds that have not been addressed after the revolution.

In this context, the importance of this report lies in tracking patterns of hate speech and analyzing its mechanisms of spread in the digital sphere, to understand the relationship between language and violence, between discourse and incitement, and between identity and division. The report was prepared at a time when Sudan is experiencing an almost complete political vacuum and partial collapse of the justice system, making the confrontation of hate speech a multiplied responsibility falling on the shoulders of rights actors, civilians, media platforms, and international bodies concerned with freedom of expression and human rights.

The preparation of this report also coincided with regional and international discussions about accountability mechanisms for grave violations being committed in the country, including calls to extend the mandate of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission and expand the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to include all regions of Sudan. In this framework, the report provides necessary analytical material for understanding how violence is produced and legitimized through words, and how hate speech can form the psychological and political ground for material violations.

Understanding the Sudanese context cannot be separated from its long history with military rule, regional marginalization, and ethnic divisions that were left unaddressed and exacerbated through civil wars, coups, and fragile political deals. Therefore, incitement discourse is not a new phenomenon, but it now takes more widespread and dangerous forms due to digital media, which transfers violent discourse from the elite to the public, from paper to direct reality, and from the margin to the center, without notable restrictions.

From this standpoint, this report aims to contribute to efforts seeking to monitor and analyze hate speech in Sudan, not only as a linguistic product but as a political tool, a mobilization mechanism, and a symbolic structure that threatens societal peace and feeds the cycle of war and division.

Methodology

Nature and Scope of the Study

This study adopts a dual analytical approach, qualitative and quantitative, to understand patterns of hate speech in the Sudanese digital space. This was done through content analysis published on three main social media platforms: X (Twitter), Facebook, and TikTok, during June 2025. The study focused on three main patterns of discourse: dangerous discourse, ethnicity-based hate speech, and political opinion-based hate speech. The choice of these platforms and forms of discourse reflects the current Sudanese context with all its political and social complexities, aiming to monitor how hostile discourse is used to feed division and fuel conflict.

Data Collection

The sample adopted in this research included 337 cases selected through systematic monitoring of public posts of an inciting, exclusionary, or hostile nature, published on the three platforms during the monitoring period. The cases included written texts, videos, and still images, and each case was documented with information related to the platform used, type of digital medium, publication timing, and level of public engagement in terms of views, likes, comments, and shares.

Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis in this research relied on SPSS, which enabled statistical data processing using quantitative description and comparative analysis methods. Through it, patterns of digital spread of hate speech were identified according to discourse type, digital platform used, medium type, and publication time period. Analyses of public engagement distribution were also conducted to understand the relationship between discourse intensity and its spread and viewing rates. Frequency tables and graphs extracted from the program revealed differences between quantity and impact, highlighting platforms and patterns with the greatest impact even if they are not the most frequent numerically.

Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative analysis was conducted using NVivo, which allowed building an integrated coding network covering different dimensions of hate speech. Content analysis methodology was adopted to understand discursive structure, relying on a mix of inductive approach to extract patterns from within the data itself, and deductive approach based on previous literature on hate speech. Each digital case was analyzed in terms of discourse pattern, linguistic features, targeted category, discourse-producing actor, and its social or political context, enabling the drawing of a comprehensive qualitative map showing how political, ethnic, and geographical dimensions intersect in producing hate speech in Sudan.

Coding Criteria

Each monitored content underwent precise coding according to several qualitative and quantitative indicators, such as discourse type (dangerous, ethnic, political), platform used (X, Facebook, TikTok), medium type (text, video, image), publication timing (morning, evening, night), targeted category (ethnic, political, geographical groups), discourse-producing entity (army supporters, Rapid Support Forces supporters, armed movements supporters, non-organizationally affiliated citizens), and language used (incitement, treason accusations, insults, dehumanization, genocide calls…). This framework helped produce an in-depth understanding of the factors shaping hate speech in the Sudanese digital context.

Ethical Considerations

The study observed ethical considerations in dealing with digital content, where data collection was limited to publicly available posts on the internet without using any private data or violating individuals’ privacy. Explicit mention of account names was also avoided unless they were known public entities, with focus on discourse content rather than personalities. Examples were used within the analytical context only, without distortion or excerpting that changes their original meaning.

Study Limitations

This study recognizes that its results reflect a limited time period (June 2025), and may not represent all time phases or all political and social developments in Sudan. Its scope is also limited to three main digital platforms, despite the existence of other platforms playing a role in spreading hatred such as WhatsApp and YouTube. However, the adopted methodology provides deep understanding of the interaction between technology, politics, and identity in producing hate speech, and provides an analytical base that can be built upon in subsequent studies.

Quantitative Analysis

This section focuses on systematic quantitative analysis of hate speech monitored across three main platforms: X (Twitter), Facebook, and TikTok, through studying a large number of cases (337 cases) classified according to a set of indicators related to type, medium, platform, time, and level of public engagement.

The analysis aims to identify spread patterns, measure impact level, and reveal disparities between quantity and attractiveness, based on accurate data collected during the monitoring period.

Below are 5 basic axes, each presented under quantitative analysis summaries, accompanied by accurate statistical results and illustrative graphs.

Discourse Spread by Type

Quantitative data shows that monitored hate speech is divided into three main patterns, distributed as follows: ethnicity-based hate speech with 118 cases, followed by political opinion-based hate speech with 113 cases, then dangerous discourse including direct incitement or threat with 105 cases. Despite the similarity in numerical distribution, dangerous discourse recorded the highest engagement and attraction rates, achieving 59,152 interactions and 822,070 views, compared to ethnic discourse (27,098 interactions and 570,848 views), and political discourse (17,015 interactions and 217,367 views). These figures reflect that discourse intensity affects its spread and engagement rate more than its repetition frequency.

Chart No. (1) Monitored Cases by Type

Chart No. (2) General Attraction Indicators

Chart No. (3) Dangerous Indicators

Chart No. (4) Ethnic Indicators

Chart No. (5) Political Indicators

Platforms Used for Publication

As for distribution across platforms, X (Twitter) ranked first in terms of number of cases (145), followed by Facebook (125), then TikTok (66). However, TikTok recorded the highest reach and engagement indicators despite being the lowest in number of cases, with views reaching 737,143 and interactions 80,038, with the number of followers for monitored accounts exceeding 6 million, while X platform, despite abundance of cases, recorded only 771,443 views and 5,775 interactions. This disparity indicates that the number of cases does not necessarily express the extent of public impact.

Chart No. (6) TikTok Indicators

Chart No. (7) X Indicators

Chart No. (8) Facebook Indicators

Digital Publication Media

Looking at the type of content used, it becomes clear that texts represent the most common form of hate speech, with 255 text posts monitored, compared to 74 videos and only 7 images. This distribution shows clear reliance on texts as the main medium for spreading hostile discourse, although visual content, especially videos, shows greater attractiveness on platforms like TikTok and achieves a higher engagement rate compared to its number.

Chart No. (9) Content Type

Temporal Distribution of Publication

Regarding the temporal distribution of publication, data revealed that hostile publication is heavily concentrated in the evening period (from 17:00 to 23:59), with 192 cases recorded during this period, more than half the total cases. This is followed by the morning period (80 cases), then midnight to dawn (72 cases), and finally the afternoon period (64 cases). This pattern reflects alignment with peak digital user activity, indicating possible deliberate publication at peak times to maximize reach and impact.

Chart No. (10) Temporal Distribution

Main Analytical Comparisons

To deepen understanding of these trends, this section includes four main analytical comparisons presented through graphs:

(1) Comparison between discourse types in terms of engagement and views, which showed that dangerous discourse has the highest impact despite not being the most numerous; (2) Comparison between platforms in terms of number of cases versus engagement and viewing indicators, where TikTok outperformed other platforms despite low number of cases; (3) Comparison between publication media (text, video, image) in terms of usage frequency, confirming text dominance; (4) Temporal comparison of publication cases highlighting the evening period as peak activity for spreading hostile discourse.

These comparisons contribute to revealing fundamental gaps between quantity and impact, supporting the recommendation for adopting response strategies that not only monitor numbers but focus on engagement indicators, platform nature, and publication pattern.

Chart No. (11) Discourse Types Comparison

Chart No. (12) Platforms Comparison

Chart No. (13) Publication Medium

Chart No. (14) Temporal Distribution Comparison

Qualitative Analysis

This chapter addresses the phenomenon of hate speech in the Sudanese digital space, through analyzing a wide sample of content published via social media platforms (X, Facebook, TikTok) collected during June 2025. The analysis focuses on three main discourse patterns: dangerous discourse, ethnicity-based discourse, and political opinion-based discourse, relying on pattern classification, linguistic features, targeted groups, and entities producing this discourse, aiming to understand its structure and social and political contexts.

Dangerous Discourse

Main Patterns of Dangerous Discourse

These patterns constitute manifestations of symbolic and direct violence at its most extreme, expressing an exclusionary and nihilistic tendency toward the other. They feature incitement to mass and individual killing, dehumanization, and geographical and ethnic cleansing, transforming discourse into a hostile mobilization tool.

Incitement to Mass Violence

This pattern refers to discourse that explicitly calls for practicing violence against a specific human group based on its ethnic, political, or regional affiliation. This violence is portrayed as a “final” and necessary solution, often presented as legitimate revenge or an unavoidable national duty. The danger in this pattern lies in transforming crime into a “moral task,” leading to inciting mass atrocities, especially in politically and ethnically divided contexts.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (1) – X

Dehumanization

This pattern depends on describing targeted groups with non-human qualities such as diseases, insects, animals, or garbage, leading to stripping them of human status. The goal is to prepare the psychological and social environment to accept violence against them, where killing, expelling, or torturing them becomes justified and even “necessary,” because they are portrayed as a biological or moral threat.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (2) – X

Generalization and Collective Demonization

In this pattern, an entire group, without distinction, is held responsible for the state’s or society’s problems, whether political, security, or economic. This type of discourse portrays these groups as a “block of absolute evil” that cannot be reformed, justifying their exclusion or annihilation. Generalization closes the door to dialogue and reinforces blind hatred.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (3) – X

Invoking Narratives of Separation and Exclusion

This pattern links individual ethnic or political affiliation to specific geographical locations, employing concepts of “authenticity” and “hospitality” to justify expulsion, forced displacement, or geographical separation. This discourse is used to impose a form of “ethnic purity” or “demographic engineering” leading to ethnic cleansing crimes and internal displacement.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (4) – X

Direct Incitement to Individual Killing

In this pattern, the shift occurs from mass incitement to targeting public figures, activists, or politicians by name, explicitly threatening them with killing or calling for their elimination. This is considered the most dangerous form of discourse because it carries a practical and direct call to commit murder, and may lead to assassinations or direct political violence.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (5) – X

Framing Violence as Legitimate National or Moral Act

This pattern depends on presenting violence, or even genocide, as a national, moral, or religious duty, giving perpetrators of crimes a sense of legitimacy and heroism. This discourse dresses violence in the cloak of “virtue,” transforming its perpetrators from criminals to “saviors,” making resistance to violence more difficult socially and morally.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (6) – Facebook

Linguistic Features of Dangerous Discourse

Linguistic features accompanying dangerous discourse analyzed show a violent and direct linguistic structure, based on incitement, stripping, and binary division of society. These features are used not only to express hatred but to build an internal logic that justifies and rationalizes violence, redefining the other as an existential threat.

Language of Annihilation and Elimination

This feature is based on using vocabulary expressing complete extinction of a human group, characterized by absolute and decisive terms. Words indicating annihilation, erasure, cutting, or ending are used, usually in direct formulations that do not allow interpretation, often built in imperative or decisive declarative form. This pattern usually appears in short, intense sentences with strong psychological impact.

Dehumanization

This style uses descriptions of targeted groups that strip them of human status, such as comparing them to diseases, insects, or filth. Language here replaces human qualities with absolute negative qualities reflecting degradation, threat, or filth. Discourse comes in direct form using absolute terms with no room for individual differences, reinforcing absolute hatred.

Mass Incitement Using Plural Pronoun

This discourse is built using plural pronouns such as “we” and “they,” used to divide society into two completely opposing factions. This appears in collective actions in plural form, reflecting psychological mobilization toward shared violent behavior. Sentences are built in mobilization form calling the audience to feel belonging to an acting group against another stigmatized group.

Deterministic Discourse (Violent Fatalism)

This pattern manifests in presenting violence as inevitable or a natural result that cannot be avoided. Statements here are characterized by finality, using structures emphasizing complete absence of any alternative, such as absolute negation or inevitable linking between the targeted group’s existence and crisis continuation. Discourse is logically closed, expressed in declarative language that does not open room for negotiation or retreat.

Direct Threat

This feature is characterized by statements directed directly at specific individuals, often in imperative, warning, or threat form, using verbs clearly indicating physical violence. The style here is personal, sharp, and often hostile, including direct naming of threat targets. Emotionally charged discourse full of anger is used, sometimes including oath or direct challenge.

Using National/Religious Language to Justify Violence

In this feature, moral or national character is given to acts of violence by linking them to major values such as “national duty,” “conscience,” “faith,” or “public interest.” Sentences here are characterized by sloganeering tone, built in triadic or rhetorical manner to enhance their symbolic presence, using highly abstract terms referring to lofty abstract concepts.

Contempt and Insulting Mockery

This feature manifests in using words that belittle or mock targeted groups. Popular or vulgar linguistic vocabulary reflecting contempt or mockery is used. Sentences are sometimes built mockingly, borrowing insulting designations from daily life or oral culture, making discourse offensive and sarcastic simultaneously.

Employing Inciting Hashtags

Tags here are used as linguistic tools expressing concentrated hostile discourse in abbreviated and direct form. Hashtags are often built with imperative verbs or inciting formulations, incorporating words indicating violence, separation, or exclusion. Words are carefully chosen to be easy to circulate and repeatable, giving discourse strong digital mobilization character.

Groups Targeted by Dangerous Discourse

Analysis indicates that dangerous discourse is not launched randomly but directed at precisely defined social, political, and geographical groups, reflecting the nature of Sudanese conflict based on politicizing identity, loyalty, and regional affiliation. Discourse here is employed for symbolic exclusion, open incitement, and justifying acts of violence against these groups by portraying them as an “existential danger” to the homeland, religion, or society.

Through analyzing material monitored on “X” and “Facebook” platforms, it is clear that dangerous discourse is systematically directed against three main groups: ethnic groups, political groups, and geographical areas. This targeting does not come casually but is directly linked to the context of political and military conflict ongoing in Sudan, where ethnic identity, political positions, and geographical affiliations are exploited to fuel hatred and justify violence.

Ethnic Groups

Ethnic groups represent the most targeted category in this type of discourse, where incitement is practiced against them in its harshest forms, from annihilation to expulsion and complete denial of national identity.

The Zaghawa tribe comes at the forefront of groups violently targeted, described as a “cancerous tribe,” with clear calls appearing to eliminate them before they can “form a solid force” inside Sudan. Zaghawa were also accused of attempting to establish a “kingdom like Chad,” indicating accusations of separatist ambition and domination.

Likewise, Ataawa groups in general (Rizeigat and Misseriya in particular) were targeted by describing them as “enemies of Sudan’s peoples,” with phrases calling to “cut their lineage” and “finish their youth,” in an extreme portrayal completely separating them from the national fabric.

As for Rizeigat, they were described as “Janjaweed incubators,” with calls appearing to strike them in their original areas, foremost the city of Ed Daein, which discourse considered a legitimate military target. Misseriya were targeted with the same racist language, linking them to tribal attacks in Darfur.

The discourse also included an attack on residents of Gezira Kanabi, where their Sudanese identity was stripped, presenting them as foreigners who must be expelled and their presence dismantled within agricultural areas.

Likewise, South Sudanese citizens were directly targeted, with calls appearing to shoot them in streets, especially in light of recalling the “Kanabi” incident in Gezira, portrayed as an internal danger linked to what happened in South Sudan after separation.

Political Groups

Targeted groups also included specific political groups, especially those holding influential positions in the transitional period or linked to previous regimes.

At the forefront of these groups comes the group known as Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), with direct inciting language, including insults and stigmatization with treason, with hostile hashtags appearing calling to “kill FFC members” and not leave any of them alive.

Additionally, the group known as “Kezan,” those affiliated with the Islamic Movement or the dissolved National Congress Party. They were described as “cancer,” “terrorists,” with calls for their complete annihilation, reaching the point of demanding their killing even if they were relatives of speakers.

The National Umma Party was subjected to mockery and belittlement, portrayed as a party that lost its history and works under leadership of a “soldier” without political qualifications, referring to connection with Rapid Support Forces.

Civilian and secular currents also received a share of hostile discourse, as they were accused of “discussing state secularism and imposing penalties on the people,” and linked to “Sudan’s humiliation and weakness,” in an effort to destroy their political and moral legitimacy.

Geographical Areas

Place did not escape targeting, as racist calls repeatedly demanding expulsion of residents of certain areas or their separation from the homeland, on ethnic or political grounds.

The city of Ed Daein emerged, as “Rizeigat capital,” as one of the most prominent proposed military targets, with phrases calling to “pound Ed Daein,” meaning militarily destroy it.

Likewise, Kanabi were targeted, mixed residential communities within agricultural projects, as dangerous areas that must be “dismantled,” transformed from a symbol of diversity to a symbol of chaos and threat, according to inciting discourse.

Hatred also reached River Nile State and Northern State, with calls to “separate them from Sudan until Resurrection Day,” accusing their residents of monopolizing power and appropriating resources.

Discourse extended to Karnoi, Tina, and Wadi Howar, where it was claimed these areas are “exclusive right of Fur, Berti, and Ziadiya tribes,” denying Zaghawa any connection to them, in an attempt to formulate a pure ethnic map based on expulsion and exclusion.

Producers of Dangerous Discourse

Analysis of hate speech reveals the presence of various actors producing and spreading it, according to their political and ethnic positions and locations within armed conflict. Dangerous discourse is not produced by one group, but its production intersects among several actors with different backgrounds, united in using inciting and exterminatory language. This multiplicity shows that hatred has become a “common” language among conflicting parties, used to mobilize supporters or settle scores.

Through analyzing material monitored on “X” and “Facebook” platforms, producers of dangerous discourse can be classified into four main categories, each category distinguished by special linguistic patterns, expressing different positions according to military, political, and ethnic alignments in Sudan. These categories are not necessarily internally consistent, but they meet in producing discourse based on hatred, exclusion, and incitement, posing a direct threat to societal peace and national coexistence.

Supporters of Sudanese Armed Forces (Army)

Discourse producers from this category tend to adopt central nationalist language elevating the Sudanese army and presenting it as protector of homeland and legitimacy. Discourse here appears in defensive and offensive form simultaneously: defense of homeland from disintegration, and attack on those considered “militias,” “mercenaries,” or “traitors.”

This manifests in focusing on demonizing Rapid Support Forces, stigmatizing specific tribes – especially from Darfur and Kordofan – as Janjaweed incubators or tools of internal invasion. Clear hostility also appears toward armed movements viewed as future arms of rebellion and division.

This category uses terms like: “cleansing,” “imposing sovereignty,” “pounding,” “eliminating agents,” linking its discourse to concepts of patriotism and military honor.

Supporters of Rapid Support Forces

This category’s discourse tends to present Rapid Support Forces as a force representing “the marginalized margin,” seeking to “liberate Sudan from Kezan and Nile elite.” Discourse appears in angry revolutionary language, with vengeful character, focusing on targeting the army, Islamist currents, and civilian political forces, describing them as symbols of injustice and marginalization.

Discourse is permeated with glorification of Rapid Support Forces’ role as justice tool, portraying ongoing war as “existential war,” where annihilation is no less than “reclaiming rights.”

Phrases like: “Kezan amputation,” “striking Jellaba,” “revolution against center” are repeated in this category’s discourse, often accompanied by clear ethnic language, tending to justify systematic violence against those portrayed as extensions of the old regime or army.

Supporters of Armed Movements

This category’s discourse is characterized by focusing on historical grievances and stolen rights of peripheral areas (Darfur, Blue Nile, South Kordofan). Discourse often comes in ethnic-political framework, where justice demand overlaps with narrative of “ancestral land” and “restoring local sovereignty.”

This type of discourse appears in expressions demanding removal of “invading tribes,” or cleansing some areas of “certain militias,” or establishing historical right of certain tribes in specific lands.

This discourse often reflects counter-exclusionary tendency toward Zaghawa (in conflicts within margin), or toward Kezan and army in Sudan generally, emphasizing role of “liberation forces” as national alternative.

Angry Citizens (Non-Aligned)

This category represents wide sectors of Sudanese producing extreme and violent discourse, not necessarily from ideological or military affiliation, but as reaction to suffering, trauma, or media polarization.

Their discourse is characterized by extreme emotionality and undisciplined reaction, depending on language of insult, generalization, and direct contempt. Description of entire groups with treason, impurity, or backwardness is repeated in their discourse, with vengeful tone reflecting personal or collective pain.

This discourse often appears on platforms like Facebook and TikTok, characterized by spontaneity and inaccuracy, but extremely dangerous because it reflects charged public opinion that can be easily mobilized toward violence.

Ethnicity-Based Discourse

Main Patterns of Ethnicity-Based Hate Speech

Ethnic discourse is considered one of the most dangerous forms of hate speech in the Sudanese context, due to its direct connection to roots of civil conflict and social division. The following discursive patterns show how ethnicity is used as a tool to justify exclusion, denial of citizenship, and incitement to mass violence. These patterns are based on the perception that Sudan consists of conflicting ethnic groups, and some groups are framed as existential threat to the state or “intruders” on the nation.

Pattern of Collective Stigmatization and Incitement Against Ethnic Groups

This pattern is based on generalizing negative attributes or accusations to include an entire group, regardless of variation among individuals within it. Discourse is used to frame an ethnic group as a collective threat, justifying discrimination and violence against it.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (7) – Facebook

Pattern of Genocide Call and Ethnic Cleansing

This pattern includes direct or indirect incitement to genocide or mass violence against specific groups, often using bloody language calling to eliminate or expel them.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (8) – Facebook

Pattern of Denying National Legitimacy and Questioning Citizenship

This pattern depends on denying targeted group’s belonging to homeland by describing them as refugees or foreigners, leading to delegitimizing their existence and political or social participation.

Pattern of Mocking Culture and Customs

This pattern works to trivialize targeted group’s cultural customs, such as dancing, singing, dialect, or appearance, through mocking language that belittles them and links them to backwardness and ignorance.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (9) – Facebook

Pattern of Ethnic Conspiracy and Hidden Control

This pattern adopts narrative claiming targeted group seeks to control state or conspired to dominate resources and influence, discourse that plants fear and collective mobilization against it.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (10) – Facebook

Pattern of Ethnic Purity and Land Ownership

This pattern promotes the idea that only a certain group has original right to land or national belonging, using words distinguishing “originals” from “arrivals” in racist manner.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (11) – Facebook

Pattern of Ethnic Contempt and Sexual and Religious Insults

This pattern includes using vulgar words, religious or sexual insults targeting origins, morals, or lineage, intending humiliation and stripping group of dignity and humanity.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (12) – X

Prevailing Linguistic Features in Ethnic Hate Speech

Ethnicity-based hate speech is not limited to its direct content but depends on deep linguistic structure reproducing exclusion through generalization, stigmatization, and contempt. These features show how the image of “ethnic enemy” is formed using rhetorical tools expressing violence, simplifying reality, and inciting masses toward hatred and hostile action.

Ethnic hate speech is not limited to content but also distinguished by specific linguistic features reflecting its exclusionary and racist essence, helping its spread and justification on a wide scale. Most prominent of these features:

Ethnic Generalization

Phrases like “all of them,” “without exception” are repeated to describe an entire group with one negative behavior or trait. This style is use

to widen accusation and hold an entire human mass responsible.

Call for Violence and Annihilation

Discourse includes vocabulary directly calling for violence, such as “expel them,” “eliminate them,” “cut them,” “annihilate them,” “prepare weapons.” This type of language aims to mobilize recipients and incite them to commit mass violence acts.

Dehumanization

Comparisons degrading other’s humanity are used, such as comparing them to animals, parasitic creatures, or diseases. Examples: “stray dogs,” “hyenas,” “spread like locusts,” “rotten sperm,” making it easier to justify targeting them and depriving them of rights.

Ethnic Conspiracy Theory

Discourse repeatedly describes targeted groups as planning to seize power or wealth, using phrases like “they control,” “coming danger,” “they dominate,” “they plan,” “spread densely.” These narratives are planted to provoke panic and build prior enmity.

Mockery and Insult

Insulting colloquial language is used like “Ambaya,” “Saket,” “smell of your armpits,” in addition to mocking customs and cultural symbols. Purpose is to undermine group’s dignity and portray it laughably or disgustingly.

Denying Citizenship and Rights

This manifests through denying group’s right to citizenship or representation, stigmatizing them with refuge or parasitism on state. Words like “Chad’s children,” “displaced,” “entered from borders” are used to deprive them of any legal or social legitimacy.

Social Sorting and Verbal Discrimination

Repeating duality of “we” versus “them,” and expressions like “country people,” “original people,” versus “strangers,” “Western children,” used to consolidate sharp social dividers between population groups.

Ethnic Groups Targeted by Ethnicity-Based Hate Speech

Monitored material reveals that ethnic discourse is not distributed equally among all groups but used selectively against certain groups based on their position in social and political hierarchy or geographical location. This discourse not only reflects hatred toward a specific group but embodies a fragmented ethnic vision of “homeland” and belonging concept, excluding those considered “foreigners” despite being citizens with full rights.

Monitored material from social media platforms (Facebook, X, and TikTok) shows a repeated pattern of collective targeting based on ethnic or ethnic affiliation, embodied in symbolic and direct violence discourse, including incitement, contempt, denying citizenship, and dehumanization. Groups targeted in these discourses can be classified into three main ethnic groups, as follows:

Black Groups (Zurqa)

Include: Zaghawa, Masalit, Fur, Hausa, Dajo, Tama, Tunjur, Borgo. Members of these groups are subjected to highest degrees of extremism and severity in hate speech, continuously portrayed as foreigners or “intruders” on the Sudanese state, accused of coming from outside the country (Chad, Nigeria, Niger). These groups are held directly responsible for armed conflicts and disturbances, accused of seeking political and economic domination through “conspiracy” or “infiltration.”

Discourse directed at them repeatedly uses terms stripping them of humanity (such as comparing them to animals or parasites), along with mocking their culture, stigmatizing them with treason and barbarism, and using discourse denying citizenship legitimacy and questioning their Sudanese identity.

Arab Groups in Darfur (Ataawa)

Include: Rizeigat, Misseriya, Beni Halba, Salamat, Taaisha, Hawazma. These groups are targeted within hostile discourse based on portraying them as symbol of violence, violation, and mercenary work. Their members are accused of executing mass crimes and engaging in systematic annihilation or looting operations, often portrayed as tools used by regimes or foreign entities to implement anti-state or anti-society agendas.

Discourse against Ataawa includes incitement to annihilation or expulsion, describing them as having no national or moral affiliation. They are also stigmatized as “diaspora Arabs,” “refugees,” “arrivals,” “Arabs” in negative sense stripping them of Sudanese authenticity attribute, placing them in rank of “intruding other” or “dangerous stranger.”

Thus, Ataawa, despite their Arab affiliation, become target of same legitimacy-denying discourse used against Black groups, revealing selective and violent nature in determining “who belongs” and “who doesn’t belong.”

Arab and Nubian Groups in Central and Northern Sudan (Jellaba)

Include: Shayqiya, Ja’alin, Danagla, Shukriya, Batahin, and all groups inhabiting central and northern Sudan. These groups are targeted within somewhat different discourse based on political, economic, and class denunciation, more than focusing on direct ethnic attributes. Members of these groups are portrayed as part of “authoritarian alliance” monopolizing rule and wealth since Sudan’s independence, and term “Jellaba” is used to stigmatize them with domination and complicity with military or colonial regimes.

Discourse against this category generally does not include direct physical incitement, but uses symbolic exclusion language, questioning fairness of their power participation, linking them to corruption and discrimination. Their history in modern state is recalled as tool to condemn present, and jokes and mockery are used in portraying them as arrogant or disconnected from rest of people’s suffering.

This triple classification reveals that hate speech in Sudan not only strikes ethnic affiliation lines but intersects with compound meanings of identity including origin, geographical affiliation, and political symbolism. Black groups are targeted as “external existential danger” source, Arab groups in Darfur are presented as “internal destruction tools,” while “Jellaba” are attacked as “central domination symbols.”

This distribution produces fertile environment for planting division and spreading collective hatred, requiring deep discursive, legal, and societal treatments to redefine meaning of belonging and national identity on comprehensive and fair civil bases.

Parties Producing Ethnicity-Based Hate Speech

Discourse analysis shows that ethnic hatred production is not limited to one actor or specific ideology but emanates from different political and social positions. These discourses are often produced as reaction to armed conflict, or as part of mass mobilization process targeting demonization of “other,” or justifying symbolic or material violence against them. Main actors in this context are not only armed or ideologized parties but include popular sectors affected by polarization and incitement.

Supporters of Sudanese Armed Forces

Sudanese army supporters produce conservative nationalist discourse, based on central narrative that “national state” is subjected to internal invasion by armed ethnic groups, not actually belonging to “original Sudanese identity” and supported by external countries. Armed Forces are presented as legitimate and original guardian of “Sudan’s unity,” versus groups portrayed as infiltrating the country from desert and working to dismantle it from within.

Army supporters’ discourse also links Rapid Support Forces with Arab ethnic components in Darfur, portraying them as tool in their hands to control state. Descriptions like “diaspora Arabs,” “guests’ children,” “bastards,” etc. are used to strip them of national attributes and provoke hostility toward them.

Its discourse also focuses on targeting Black groups, especially Zaghawa, where they are accused of being “intruders,” “displaced,” or “illegal immigrants” who came from Chad and Nigeria. This denial of national belonging is used as pretext for incitement to exclusion from political equation.

Supporters of Rapid Support Forces

Rapid Support Forces supporters adopt discourse based on narrative of “marginalized in confrontation with oppressive center.” Rapid Support Forces is portrayed as extension of historically oppressed Sudanese margins, especially from Darfur and Kordofan. Conflict with army is presented as struggle between “margin” and “Jellaba” – meaning Arab Nile elites who ruled Sudan since independence.

Terms like “Jellabi,” “River sons,” “Shayqiya and Ja’alin” are used in this discourse, holding them responsible for all Sudan’s tragedies from poverty to war. This aims to strip moral and political legitimacy from army and central state, describing them as oppression tools.

Black groups in Darfur, especially Zaghawa, are also targeted, described as “tools,” “Jellaba followers,” subjected to mockery and defamation.

Supporters of Armed Movements in Darfur

Discourse of Darfur armed movements supporters produces explicit ethnic logic, based on duality of “indigenous residents” versus “arriving Arabs.” Conflict in region since its beginnings is presented as existential struggle between Black components historically inhabiting Darfur, and Arab components claimed to have arrived from outside borders, especially from Libya and Chad.

Arab groups in Darfur – such as Rizeigat, Misseriya, Beni Halba, and Taaisha – are described as “diaspora Arabs,” “mercenary militias,” descriptions used to strip them of citizenship and deprive them of right to land or political participation. They are also historically linked to massacres and mass annihilations, held responsible for crimes committed by Janjaweed previously or Rapid Support Forces currently or previous regimes.

Also, Arab ethnic groups in central and northern Sudan are described as main causes of historical marginalization and committing historical violations against Black groups, by armed movements supporters, in addition to intensifying current power competition between army and armed movements and rise of separatist discourse demanding separation of Darfur from rest of Sudan.

Political Opinion-Based Discourse

Main Patterns in Political Hate Speech

Political hate speech manifests when political disagreement transforms into complete demonization process of opponent, not treated as legitimate political actor but as traitor, enemy, or “virus” that must be eradicated. Following patterns show that this type of discourse uses linguistic, moral, and religious tools to completely delegitimize opponent, incite masses against them, paving way for either exclusion or direct political violence.

Pattern of Treason and Agency

This pattern refers to using political discourse to accuse opponents of national treason and foreign agency, describing them as tools executing regional or international powers’ agendas. Opponent here is not presented as local political actor with different position but as “hired agent” who lost legitimacy.

This pattern feeds on Sudanese context characterized by deep popular suspicions toward external interventions (UAE, Israel, West, etc.), making it effective means to turn public opinion.

Within this framework falls accusation of receiving foreign funding, coordinating with embassies, or even promoting peace as treason in name of Chapter VII.

This language is used to justify exclusion, demonize all political mediation or civil work attempts as manifestation of “political mercenary work.”

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (13) – X

Pattern of Contempt and Stripping of Patriotism

This pattern transcends criticizing political performance to challenging opponent’s human and moral essence, by describing them with insulting words belittling their worth and dignity, portraying them as unpatriotic or “vile.”

Discourse based on class and moral classifications consolidating humiliation is used, opponent portrayed as trivial, base, or cowardly person.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (14) – X

Pattern of Demonization and Symbolic Takfir

This pattern is characterized by mixing religious and political, where religious discourse is used to strip opponent of doctrinal legitimacy, portraying them as criminal against religion not only against homeland.

Opponent is described as “infidel,” “immoral,” “follower of Satan’s party,” moving discourse from disagreement sphere to “existential conflict” sphere.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (15) – X

Pattern of Identity and Ethnicity Manipulation

This pattern expresses tendency to strip national belonging from opponent by questioning their ethnicity, origins, or regional affiliation, making them stranger in audience’s eyes.

Sudan’s ethnic diversity is exploited to create narrative about “intruders” and “country sons.”

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (16) – X

Pattern of Incitement to Violence and Exclusion

This pattern is embodied in open or implicit calls to politically exclude opponent or physically eliminate them, whether by supplication, threat, or mass incitement.

Opponent is treated as enemy in battlefield, justifying violence against them.

Pattern of Aggressive Metaphors

This pattern depends on linguistic metaphor to portray opponent as sick body (cancer), parasitic creature (worm, mosquito), or infection.

These metaphors transform political entity into “biological enemy,” meaning something that must be cleaned or killed, not debated.

Example from Analyzed Material:

Example No. (17) – X

Groups Targeted by Political Affiliation-Based Hate Speech

Political inciting discourse is used to target specific political currents, based on their positions on authority or military conflict. This discourse takes form of verbal attacks undermining political actor’s legitimacy, transforming them into “internal danger” that must be silenced or removed. This discourse often feeds on state of acute polarization, where no room is left for negotiation or dialogue, but complete exclusion is used as political tool.

Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)

Civilian political alliance founded during Sudanese revolution in December 2018, includes leftist, liberal, and professional parties. It led transitional period after Bashir regime fall until October 2021 coup, currently split into two political currents, one (Sumud/Steadfastness) is targeted in this section.

Analysis of Discourse Directed Against Forces of Freedom and Change (Sumud)

Hate speech against Forces of Freedom and Change was characterized by extreme and violent nature, repeatedly described as traitorous group and agent of foreign powers, especially UAE.

Its political leadership was also linked to abroad, presented as “sold martyrs’ blood.”

Treason discourse appeared in vulgar and direct formulations, including descriptions like “agency,” “moral degradation,” “political mercenary work.”

Additionally, contemptuous descriptions like “Qahata,” “traitors,” “defects,” “cheapest sect” emerged.

Religious language also included alliance demonization by linking it to “infidelity” and “corruption on earth,” along with religious supplications for annihilating its members.

Linguistic mockery was used to trivialize alliance name and turn it into satire material.

This pattern shows desire for FFC’s complete political and social elimination.

National Congress Party (Kezan)

Former ruling party, linked to Islamic Movement led by Omar Bashir, remained in power from 1989 until December 2018 revolution. Known for corruption, repression, and monopolizing power.

Analysis of Discourse Directed Against National Congress:

Party was targeted as responsible for Sudan’s ruin, portrayed as “malignant tumor” that must be removed.

Biological metaphors describing it as “cancer,” “worm,” “satanic organization” were repeated.

It was also equated with extremist groups like “ISIS,” accused of religious and doctrinal violence.

Discourse focused on holding party responsible for thirty years of war, poverty, and ignorance.

Descriptions like “cowardice,” “irreligious,” “filth” were directed at its members.

Despite its fall, party remained present target recalled in context of comparison with current civilian forces.

Producers of Political Hate Speech

Political affiliation-based hate speech is not limited to one side but produced by multiple parties within Sudanese political spectrum, each according to their position in power, opposition, or military conflict. This diversity reflects that political hatred has become conflict tool and not only its reflection, where used to eliminate opponents, distort them, and mobilize masses against them.

Army Supporters

This category’s discourse focuses on accusing civilians of treason, especially Forces of Freedom and Change, stigmatizing them with agency and conspiracy with Rapid Support Forces.

Phrases like “sold martyrs’ blood,” “traitorous leftists,” “infidelity and agency organizations” are repeated in this discourse, and religion is used to frame them as enemies of religion and homeland.

This discourse is characterized by harshness, mixing political criticism with social and religious incitement, undermining political coexistence possibility.

National Congress Supporters (Kezan)

Despite party’s official fall, its active elements on social media produce offensive discourse against revolution forces.

This discourse is characterized as vengeful, retrieving “empowerment” vocabulary, justifying coup, describing civilians as “weak,” “ruinous,” “lacking manners.”

This discourse is used to whitewash National Congress experience, holding civilian opposition responsible for war and economic collapse.

Revolution Supporters (FFC, Resistance Committees, Civilians)

In contrast, some civilian forces produce inciting discourse against “Kezan” and “military,” characterized by desire for complete exclusion, expressing desire for revenge not just change.

Kezan description as “rats,” “cancer,” “filth” is repeated, held responsible for national ruin and bloodshed.

Despite civilian background of this discourse, it sometimes uses language similar to its opponents, in terms of symbolic violence and collective demonization.

Rapid Support Forces Supporters

Rapid Support Forces supporters produce concentrated hostile discourse against Islamists and National Congress, presented as extension of revenge for previous regime practices. Kezan are portrayed in this discourse as symbol of corruption, oppression, and tyranny, held responsible for massacres, divisions, and wars in Sudan.

Discourse includes inciting terms like “Kezan eradication,” “satanic organization uprooting,” “Kezan are cancer,” showing clear hostile expressions against those believed to be extension of previous rule or oppose revolution.

This type of discourse is used to justify war support, absolve Rapid Support Forces from any accusations, by focusing on common enemy: Islamists. This language is also linked to discourse of “liberating Sudan from obscurantists,” giving moral dimension to political violence.

Below are tables showing pattern, linguistic feature, and targeted group repetition in hate speech, from analyzed sample:

Table No. (1) Dangerous Discourse

Table No. (2) Ethnic Discourse

Table No. (3) Political Discourse

Effects of Hate Speech in Generating Violence, Discrimination, and Human Rights Violations

First: Violence Escalation

Psychological Framing of Violence as Only Option

Linguistic features such as deterministic discourse, language of annihilation and elimination, and direct incitement show that speaker leaves no room for any peaceful options. When said: “annihilation is solution,” or “no choice but to amputate them,” mental structure is formed programming recipient that violence is only available course. These formulations are used to build what is known in social psychology as “closed frame,” where doors of other alternatives are closed, including tolerance, negotiation, or transitional justice.

Dehumanization as Prelude to Killing

Using descriptions like “cancer,” “hyenas,” “garbage,” or “mosquitoes,” reproduces what is called in comparative studies pre-genocide propaganda, as happened in Rwanda or Nazi Germany. This dehumanization creates psychological readiness among actors and society to accept, or even participate in, killing or mass expulsion acts, without guilt feeling.

Mass Mobilization and Enemy Manufacturing

Features like using plural pronoun (“we” versus “them”) play fundamental role in building “two camps” narrative. This creates psychological alliance around group and mobilizes it against other, making violence justified collective act, not individual crime. When this accompanies religious or national language (“fighting is national duty”), violence acts transform from criminal behavior to “collective duty.”

Digital Media as Violence Lever

Material shows that TikTok, for example, despite few posts, achieved highest engagement. This indicates short visual media’s ability to transmit violence and incitement more intensely and emotionally, accelerating hate speech transition to hostile action, especially among youth or non-ideologized groups.

Second: Legitimizing Discrimination

Reproducing Ethnic and Political Hierarchy

Linguistic features related to denying citizenship, ethnic or geographical discrimination, such as “guests’ children,” “Chad’s children,” “Rizeigat without origin,” reshape homeland identity on selective ethnic bases. This leads to what is known as negative identity, where homeland is defined not by who is in it, but by who must be excluded.

Building Concept of “National Entitlement”

When some are portrayed as “intruders,” it creates social class undeserving of rights, resources, or even protection from violence. Legitimization here is not announced explicitly but built symbolically through language, making state exclusive to “originals,” stripping other of right to education, political representation, assistance, and even life.

Codifying Social and Political Exclusion

These discourses do not remain only symbolic but transform into ground for discriminatory legislation or practices. For example, challenging “Kanabi Sudanese identity,” or demanding “Northern State separation” from Sudan, is not merely opinion but establishing racist solutions based on geographical and population separation, resembling apartheid system or sectarian division.

Interactive Discrimination in Digital Space

Material shows that most extreme discourse (like ethnic and dangerous discourse) harvests higher engagement. This contributes to normalizing discrimination as societal value, where racist discourse producers are rewarded with fame and support, reinforcing its repetition and spread within general audience.

Third: Justifying Rights Violation and Denial

Stripping Victims of Moral and Legal Protection

When opponent is portrayed as “cancer,” “germ,” or “worm eating state,” “victim” status is dropped from them. When violence against them is presented as “treatment” or “cleaning,” all legal principles stipulating their protection are excluded. These are same premises used in ethnic cleansing or political liquidation operations in many countries.

Denying Civil and Political Rights

Inciting discourse often accompanies contempt for political opponents describing them as “Qahata,” “mercenaries,” “secularism advocates,” descriptions not attacking policies but stripping actor of their civil status. This is used to justify preventing demonstration, arresting activists, rejecting their political participation as “deviant category” or “traitors to homeland and religion.”

Justifying Atrocities Through “Duty” Language

Linguistic features linking violence to national or moral duty transform killers into “saviors,” covering crimes with heroism cloak. Explicit examples appear in phrases like “Kezan annihilation is moral duty,” or “finish their youth so they know democracy.” This paves way for social impunity for violators making their later accountability difficult.

Creating Paralyzed Legal Climate

When hate speech becomes prevalent, trust in justice institutions erodes, their mechanisms paralyzed, especially if official actors complicit in producing or promoting this discourse. This leads to state’s inability to protect rights, facilitates committing mass crimes or systematic discrimination without accountability.

Legal Framework

Hate speech, as documented by this study in its linguistic patterns and inciting impact, constitutes direct violation of wide system of international, regional, and national laws aimed at protecting human dignity, ensuring equality, and preventing incitement to violence or discrimination. These violations are clear at four interconnected levels: international human rights law, international humanitarian law, regional covenants, and Sudanese law.

International Human Rights Law

Hate speech directly violates several fundamental principles in international human rights law, foremost the right to life and physical safety, as stated in Article 6 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, stipulating that “right to life is inherent to every human being” and states have obligation to protect it from any arbitrary violation. This discourse is also considered explicit breach of Article 20 of same covenant, prohibiting “any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.”

Content of inciting discourse contradicts provisions of International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, especially Article 4 obligating states to criminalize all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, preventing any form of incitement to discrimination. Discourses containing insult, contempt, or dehumanization also touch Article 7 of same international covenant, prohibiting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

Although freedom of expression is guaranteed under Article 19, this freedom is not considered absolute but restricted if related to protecting others’ dignity, public order, or targeted groups’ rights. Accordingly, hate speech including incitement to violence or promoting genocide or ethnic liquidation, does not fall under freedom of expression but is considered crime supposedly met with deterrent legal measures.

International Humanitarian Law

In armed conflicts context, hate speech takes more serious dimensions, as it may directly contribute to committing grave violations of international humanitarian law. According to Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, direct and public incitement to commit genocide is considered standalone international crime, punishable by law even if crime not committed.

Violations umbrella expands to include crimes against humanity if discourse linked to incitement to killing, forced transfer, or systematic persecution, as stated in Article 7 of Statute. Article 25 of same Statute refers to individual criminal responsibility for any person encouraging or facilitating committing these crimes, including discourse producers in digital space.

This type of discourse, especially when built on ethnicity, origin, or geographical affiliation, is also considered violation of Common Article 3 in Geneva Conventions, prohibiting degrading and dignity-degrading treatment, including incitement to liquidation, exclusion, or violence. It is noted that hate speech in Sudan, according to this report’s findings, functionally leads to psychological and social preparation for such violations, requiring strict legal response at international level.

Regional Covenants

Hate speech also contradicts provisions of African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), which is first regional reference in African continent for protecting civil, political, economic, and social rights. Charter in its Articles 2, 3, and 4 stipulates prohibiting any form of discrimination based on race, origin, or opinion, equality in enjoying rights and freedoms, and right to life, dignity, and physical safety.

In addition to individual rights, Charter gives special importance to individuals’ responsibilities toward society, as in Article 28, holding each person responsible for respecting others, promoting tolerance spirit and mutual understanding. Hate speech, whether political, ethnic, or religious, is considered direct undermining of these principles, where it produces discourse that excludes, demeans, and re-entrenches ethnic and class division, threatening national unity, weakening legal and social institutions.

From this standpoint, hate speech in Sudan cannot be viewed separately from state’s responsibility in preventing it, holding its promoters accountable, cooperating with regional mechanisms like African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to address its political and rights effects.

Sudanese Law

Despite Sudanese Criminal Code of 1991 not containing explicit text criminalizing hate speech, there are articles that can be interpreted to include some manifestations of this discourse, such as articles related to disturbing public peace, incitement, and dignity insult. However, these texts remain inadequate to respond to phenomenon’s size and its updated nature especially in digital space, and do not keep pace with Sudan’s international obligations in this area.

As Sudan is party to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Convention Against Racial Discrimination, it is legally obligated to harmonize its internal legislation with these covenants. Article 27 of Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties also obligates state not to invoke its internal law to justify non-implementation of its international obligations.

In this context, absence of national legislation specifically combating hate speech is considered dangerous legal gap, contributing to spread of symbolic violence and political and social exclusion, exposing country to more divisions and violations, especially in light of ongoing conflict and institutional collapse. It is recommended to include explicit texts in Sudanese criminal and civil legislation criminalizing hate speech and incitement to discrimination, ensuring effective mechanisms for prevention, protection, and accountability.

General Conclusions

This report’s results reveal disturbing picture of hate speech spread level and danger in Sudanese digital space, especially during context in which war erupted between Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces since April 2023. Social media platforms have transformed into parallel conflict arena, managed not only by weapons but by language loaded with incitement, treason accusations, and exclusion, playing decisive role in feeding field violence and expanding its scope.

Adopted methodology, combining qualitative analysis (using NVivo) and quantitative analysis (using SPSS), showed that hate speech was not isolated or random phenomenon but organized and repeated pattern carrying linguistic and structural features that can be measured and classified. 337 cases published on three main platforms (X, Facebook, TikTok) were documented, distributed into three main patterns: dangerous discourse, ethnicity-based discourse, and political opinion-based discourse.

Data revealed difference in engagement and impact nature according to discourse type and platform, where TikTok was lowest in number of posts but highest in public engagement, indicating short visual media power in consolidating violent discourse, especially among youth groups. Quantitative comparisons also showed that dangerous and ethnic discourse receives greater engagement compared to political discourse, highlighting digital mood nature inclined to extremism and exaggeration.

Qualitative analysis revealed fixed and dangerous linguistic patterns including direct incitement to genocide, dehumanization, denying citizenship, mockery and ridicule, ethnic superiority, treason accusations, and linking targeted groups to animalism, impurity, or treason. These patterns, according to international literature, are not only symbolic tools but preludes paving way for committing material violence acts.

Analysis showed that hate speech directly contributes to violence escalation and transforming it into accepted and justified behavior, also reproduces class, ethnic, and regional discrimination system within society, justifies denying and rejecting basic rights of political or ethnic opponents. It is discourse that not only threatens victims but undermines foundations of coexistence, tears social fabric, weakens building just peace opportunities.

It is also clear that this type of discourse is considered flagrant violation of integrated legal system, including international human rights law, international humanitarian law, regional covenants, and even general principles in Sudanese law. It violates right to life, equality, opinion freedom without incitement, considered under Rome Statute as potential incitement to international crimes requiring prosecution. Report also reveals internal legislative vacuum in Sudan toward criminalizing this discourse, despite state’s international obligations.

Based on above, several central conclusions can be drawn:

Hate speech in Sudan is not casual phenomenon but essential component of political and ethnic conflict components, becoming effective action and collective impact tool.

This discourse’s digital spread does not separate from field violence but accompanies and legitimizes it, leading to normalizing violation and giving symbolic legitimacy to it.

National legislation weakness, accountability absence, and high engagement level with inciting discourses, form fertile environment for conflict sustainability, threatening societal peace in long term.

There is urgent necessity to explicitly criminalize hate speech in Sudanese law, activate local and international accountability tools, including supporting International Criminal Court jurisdiction and Fact-Finding Mission in monitoring and analyzing inciting discourse as part of structure paving way for international crimes.

Rights, media, and civilian entities also have pivotal role in dismantling hatred narratives, confronting their spread with alternative discourse based on diversity, recognition, justice, and shared belonging.

Confronting hate speech is not only linguistic battle but battle for Sudan’s future, its unity, justice, and peace.

Recommendations

In light of what this report revealed about dangerous hate speech patterns spread in Sudanese digital space, and through precise analysis of this discourse’s impact on societal and institutional violence structure, and in light of legal failure in confronting it, report recommends set of measures and procedures targeting decision-makers, judicial institutions, civil society, digital platforms, and international entities.

First: Recommendations for Transitional Government and Sudanese Legislators

  • Preparing special draft law to combat hate speech and incitement to violence and discrimination, clearly defining hate speech, criminalizing it without prejudicing responsible freedom of expression, ensuring its harmonization with international conventions ratified by Sudan.
  • Reviewing Criminal Code of 1991 and amending it to include texts clearly criminalizing incitement to hatred based on race, origin, political or religious affiliation, with tightening penalties on cases contributing to igniting or justifying violence.
  • Supporting judiciary and prosecution independence and enabling them to initiate investigation in cases related to incitement and genocide discourses, especially those spreading through digital media and threatening civil peace.
  • Directing state media and educational apparatuses toward producing alternative national discourse consolidating equal citizenship and diversity recognition, opposing historical racism and discrimination.

Second: Recommendations for Civil Society and Rights Organizations

  • Launching continuous awareness campaigns targeting general public about hate speech dangers and its legal and social effects, focusing on youth groups active on digital platforms.
  • Building platforms for continuous monitoring and documentation of digital hate speech, working on analyzing it according to scientific standards, linking it to political and field transformations.
  • Providing psychological and legal support to hate speech victims, whether individuals or targeted groups, including community solidarity campaigns, providing legal assistance in incitement and threat cases.
  • Training journalists, digital users, and media actors on hate speech monitoring and dismantling mechanisms, producing alternative content enhancing tolerance culture.

Third: Recommendations for Social Media Platforms and Technology Companies

  • Developing early detection algorithms for hate speech in Sudanese dialect and local Arabic, enhancing cooperation with Sudanese rights organizations to monitor and identify harmful content.
  • Appointing content reviewers from Sudan or familiar with local cultural and political context to understand symbols and references specific to hate speech in Sudanese context.
  • Publishing periodic reports on platform’s procedures toward hate speech in Sudan, including number of deleted cases, received reports, forms of cooperation with civil society organizations.
  • Creating transparent appeal mechanisms for users whose content is blocked, providing clear channels for reporting hate speech, enhancing transparency in deletion and restriction decisions.

Fourth: Recommendations for International and Regional Mechanisms

  • Expanding Fact-Finding Mission powers under Human Rights Council to include systematic monitoring of digital hate speech, considering it early indicator of grave crimes in Sudanese conflict.
  • Supporting International Criminal Court efforts in tracking relationship between hate speech and public incitement to crimes against humanity, considering this discourse makers criminally responsible if their connection to field results is proven.
  • Urging UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and African Union to support initiatives building Sudanese justice institutions’ capacities in dealing with hate speech.
  • Integrating hate speech as violence tool in all UN monitoring mechanisms reports specific to Sudan, especially those related to human rights situation, displacement, and transitional justice.

References

  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted December 16, 1966, entered into force March 23, 1976.
  • International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution December 21, 1965, entered into force January 4, 1969.
  • Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, entered into force January 27, 1980.
  • Rome Statute of International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002.
  • Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, Common Article 3 between Conventions, applying in non-international armed conflicts.
  • African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), adopted June 27, 1981, entered into force October 21, 1986.
  • Sudanese Criminal Code of 1991.
  • Sudan’s accession to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1986.
  • Sudan’s accession to International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1977.
  • General Comment No. 34 of UN Human Rights Committee on Article 19 of International Covenant (freedom of opinion and expression), issued in 2011.
  • General Comment No. 11 of Human Rights Committee on Article 20 of International Covenant (prohibition of advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred), issued in 1983.

Annexes

  • Graphs: (Click link)
  • Examples: (Click link)
  • Tables: (Click link)
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We are an independent, non-profit human rights organization, founded in 2025 by Sudanese lawyers and human rights defenders in response to the worsening violations and deterioration of justice in Sudan.

The Center seeks to protect human rights and ensure fairness and accountability by providing legal and humanitarian support, documenting violations, and advocating locally and internationally to end impunity.

It also works to develop judicial institutions and legislation to align with international standards, and calls for accession to and ratification of international conventions to strengthen the rule of law.

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